Accepted papers are
From Random Probing to Noisy Leakages Without Field-Size Dependence
Authors: Gianluca Brian, Stefan Dziembowski, Sebastian Faust
More about the paper:
In cryptography, the security of algorithms is typically proved in a security model. The so-called random probing model has become established for analysing the security of masking techniques against side-channel attacks. In this model, it is assumed that each intermediate value of a calculation is revealed to the attacker with a certain probability. This probability depends on both the protection mechanisms used and the noise present in the physical measurements.
Current research assumes that a system that is secure in the random probing model should also be secure against side-channel attacks in the real world, as long as the physical noise in a measurement is large enough. Previous methods with random probing security require a high level of physical noise to achieve provable security. In the research presented here, it has been shown that cryptographic schemes can guarantee security by adding randomisation steps even when there is significantly less noise in the physical measurement. This is particularly important for cryptographic systems that use large fields, such as the AES encryption standard or more recent post-quantum schemes.

Connecting Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharingto Practice: Scaling Trends and Physical Dependencies of Prime Field Masking
Authors: Sebastian Faust, Loïc Masure, Elena Micheli, Maximilian Orlt, François-Xavier Standaert
More about the paper:
This paper investigates the fundamental security properties of addition operations within prime fields and their relevance to the design of countermeasures against side-channel attacks. The research focuses on two prominent side-channel information exploited by attacks: Bit Leakage and Hamming Weight Leakage. The challenge in designing these countermeasures is to balance physical security and efficient implementation. However, current security analyses of these countermeasures do not describe how the vulnerability to side-channel attacks varies with different prime numbers and their respective sizes. The results of the work show a fundamental trend: while larger prime fields increase the risk of bit leakage, increasing the field size can provide exponential security improvements for Hamming weight leakage.
This observation represents a significant advance in the design of future cryptographic schemes that operate over large prime fields. It also highlights the need for further research to better understand and characterise side-channel attacks to ensure better protection in the long run.

Prof. Faust is head of the Applied Cryptography Group at TU Darmstadt. His research projects on "Secure and Scalable Blockchain Technologies" are embedded in the DFG-funded Collaborative Research Centre "CROSSING" at TU Darmstadt. In ATHENE, he coordinates the research area "Trustworthy Date Ecosystems".

The researchers will present their work at Eurocrypt 2024 in Zurich from May 26 to 30, 2024.