| Abstract | The revelation of the Stuxnet malware in 2010 shed light on the presence of state actors that are willing and capable of developing and using highly sophisticated, specialized malicious software for their political interests. These tools -often dubbed cyber weapons -are expected to become the next major advancement in weaponry technology. Besides the threats of offensive cyber operations for civil IT systems due to the interconnected nature of the cyberspace, international regulation of cyber weapons is -among other aspects -hindered by the fact that the military development and the strategic and tactical deployment of cyber weapons differ significantly from other weapons technologies. In order to establish measures of cyber arms related control treaties, it is crucial to identify these particular characteristics. Based on this premise, the article analyzes the current perspectives on cyber weapons, identifying their weaknesses of being either based on assumptions about adversarial actors or being applicable only after the usage of a malicious tool. In contrast to these approaches, the article focuses on the specific functional aspects of malware and presents an indicator-based assessment model based on parameters that can be measured prior to the application of malicious software. This enables the categorization of malicious tools as cyber weapons. Besides this, the article aims to introduce thought-provoking impulses with regard to social responsibility in computer science. |
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