Publikationen

Autor	Meyer, Christopher; Somorovsky, Juraj; Weiss, Eugen; Schwenk, Jörg; Schinzel, Sebastian; Tews, Erik
Datum	2014
Art	Conference Proceedings
Abstrakt	As a countermeasure against the famous Bleichenbacher attack on RSA based ciphersuites, all TLS RFCs starting from RFC 2246 (TLS 1.0) propose “to treat incorrectly formatted messages in a manner indistinguishable from correctly formatted RSA blocks”. In this paper we show that this objective has not been achieved yet (cf. Table 1): We present four new Bleichenbacher side channels, and three successful Bleichenbacher attacks against the Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE) SSL/TLS implementation and against hardware security appliances using the Cavium NITROX SSL accelerator chip. Three of these side channels are timingbased, and two of them provide the first timing-based Bleichenbacher attacks on SSL/TLS described in the literature. Our measurements confirmed that all these side channels are observable over a switched network, with timing differences between 1 and 23 microseconds. We were able to successfully recover the PreMasterSecret using three of the four side channels in a realistic measurement setup.
ISBN	978 -1- 931971-15 -7
Serie	SEC'14
In	Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX conference on Security Symposium, p.733-748
Publisher	USENIX Association
Schlüssel	TUD-CS-2014-1099
Url	https://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/id/eprint/98212

Revisiting SSL/TLS Implementations: New Bleichenbacher Side Channels and Attacks